Journal of Human Security | 2025 | Volume 21 | Issue 2 | Pages 116-120
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12924/johs2025.210218
ISSN: 1835–3800

Journal of Human Security

Research Article

Russia's De-Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Interim Obligation under Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Dr. Thamer Abdullah Alraddadi[1]

[1]Assistant Professor of International Law, Jeddah College of Law, University of Business and Technology. Email: t.alraddadi@ubt.edu.sa

***Correspondence:** t.alraddadi@ubt.edu.sa

Submitted: 25 July 2025 | Revised: 10 November 2025 | Accepted: 10 December 2025 | Published: 30 December 2025

Abstract: The official withdrawal of Russia's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in November 2023 is one of the most significant and legally complicated events of the modern international arms-control law. The Russian Federation has created a sense of urgent inquiries in the interpretation and sustainability of interim treaty responsibilities under Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) by withdrawing the instrument of ratification deposited in 2000. That provision requires the states which have signed or ratified a treaty pending entry into force to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. The present article holds the view, based on a systematic analysis of the text of treaties, International Law Commission (ILC) commentary, and comparative state practice, that Russia de-ratification was not sufficiently clear not to become a party under Article 18(a) VCLT, and thus that Russia is bound by the interim obligation of not to hold nuclear explosive tests. The analysis identifies the difference between de-ratification and formal unsigning and the practice of the United States in relation to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Arms Trade Treaty as paradigmatic comparators and assesses whether the exception of Article 18(b) of the prolonged non-entry into force has been imposed by the CTBT. The paper ends up by offering implications to compliance monitoring, treaty law doctrine and the nuclear testing taboo.

Keywords: CTBT; de-ratification; Article 18 VCLT; interim obligations; unsigning; nuclear testing taboo; Vienna Convention; treaty withdrawal.

1. Introduction

The international legal order regulating arms control and disarmament is based on a precarious structure of multilateral treaty commitments, normative expectations and norms of good faith that together form what scholars have called community of mutual restraint [1]. Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened to signature in September 1996, has a unique normative and strategic role to play. Although the treaty has yet to come into force due to the non-ratification of eight states party to Annex 2, it has received the signatures of 187 states and the ratifications of 178 which represents an almost universal global norm against nuclear explosive testing [2]. It was against this backdrop that the Russian Federation's withdrawal of its ratification of the CTBT in November 2023 caused widespread consternation and calls for Russia to reconsider its position immediately came in from states and civil society and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) [3; 4]. The legislative process for the de-ratification went forward rapidly. In October 2023, a bill on withdrawal was discussed in the State Duma State Duma of the Russian [5], the Federation Council approved the measure on 25 October 2023 [6], and on 2 November 2023, President Putin signed the law. The withdrawal of the instrument of ratification of the multilateral treaties was duly registered by the United Nations Secretary-General who was acting as a depository of the multilateral treaties within the United Nations with effect as at 3 November 2023 [7]. The reason of Russia, which was to gain the same level of parity as the United States, that signed the CTBT in 1996, but had not ratified the treaty, was directly defined as a reflecting exercise, but not a categorical condemnation of the purposes of the treaty [8]. Russian officials stated at the same time that Russia would not quit being a signatory and participating in the CTBTO verification regime. This juxtaposition between legal act and repudiation of the implications thereof at once results in a doctrinal problem of the first order. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, States which have signed or ratified a treaty which is pending entry into force assume interim obligations under Article 18. Specifically, Article 18(a) provides that signatories shall refrain from acts defeating the object and purpose of a treaty until they have 'made [their] intention clear not to become a party' while Article 18(b) extends an analogous obligation to States which have expressed consent to be bound, 'provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed' [9]. The central legal question raised by Russia's action is easy to formulate but complex to resolve: does the withdrawal of a ratification before entry into force - and a procedure for which there is no explicit regulation in the VCLT - amount to the 'making clear' of an intention not to become a party in the first place under article 18(a), or does it lead to the 'undue delay' exception under article 18(b), whereby Russia's interim obligations are extinguished? This is not a purely intellectual question. The object and purpose of the CTBT is to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions as well as any other nuclear explosions [2] is directionally consistent with imperatives of non-proliferation and disarmament of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The United Nations Security [10], adopted by fourteen votes with one abstention, that a nuclear explosion by a signatory state would foil the object and purpose of the CTBT [10]. An accompanying political statement to the same effect was co-sponsored by all five NPT-recognised nuclear-weapon states, including Russia. In this context the legal issue of Russia's interim obligations bears directly on the issue of restraints operating on a major nuclear armed state at a moment of increased geopolitical tension. Were Russia legally free to resume nuclear explosive testing, this existential risk calculus for global security would change substantially [11; 12]. The article goes something like this. Section 2 is a survey of the scholarly literature on VCLT Article 18 and treaty withdrawal, unsigning, and the nuclear testing taboo. The section 3 outlines the doctrinal approach to the methodology and presents the main and secondary sources that the analysis relies on. Section 4, which is the analytical core, discusses Russia's particular situation based on close reading of Article 18, ILC commentaries, depositary practice, and comparative analysis with the practice of the United States as it relates to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) respectively. Section 5 gives the article findings, remarks, and the wider implications of the treaty law and arms-control regulation. The subject matter of the present inquiry is thus limited to the legal dimensions of Russia's interim obligations under public international law. Political motivations for the de-ratification, though contextually relevant, are not independently measured as to anything other than their relevance to inferring Russia's legal intent. The contribution of this article is to the under-theorised area of treaty law of the rights and duties of states that retract

consent to be bound before a treaty's entry into force at a time where the practical stakes of such a doctrine have rarely been higher [13; 14].

2. Literature Review

2.1 The Structure and Content of Article 18 VCLT

Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is at the crossroads of treaty consent, good faith and the protection of multilateral treaties regimes [15; 16]. The provision was introduced when the ILC was drafting the VCLT to deal with the normatively troubling scenario that a state might use the period between signatory states signing and ratifying - or ratifying and entry into force - as an opportunity to take actions that would be incompatible with the purposes of the treaty without any formal breach [17]. According to the commentary of the ILC to what was to become Article 18, the authors intended to enshrine an obligation based on the principle of good faith: a state that has expressed an intention to assume treaty obligations cannot in the transitional stage before such obligations have formally crystallised act in a manner that frustrates the object of the treaty that it has expressed its willingness to join [17; 18].

The scholarly treatment of Article 18 has changed a great deal since the adoption of the Convention. Until recently, commentators, such as Sinclair [19] and McNair [16], have approached the provision as a fairly non-controversial codification of an emergent customary norm, based on the principles of estoppel and good faith. Sinclair said of the obligation that it was 'of a negative and limited character' but nevertheless capable of sustaining significant legal consequences where a signatory undertook 'radical steps incompatible with the basic purposes of the treaty' [19]. Aust [15] similarly characterised the provision as a 'reasonable limitation on sovereignty' reflecting the more general principle of pacta sunt servanda in its inchoate form.

Increasingly current scholarship has scrutinized the borders of the Article 18 obligation in more analytical detail. Rydberg [13] has provided the most in-depth modern analysis by separating the interim duties which have been emanated by Article 18 and Article 25 VCLT and has also made the argument that the two are complimentary regimes rather than overlapping. Rydberg constructs three structural components of the operation of Article 18, namely: (i) the factual trigger- signature or expressed consent to be bound; (ii) the substantive obligation- not acting so as to defeat the object and purpose; and (iii) the conditions of termination- clear expression of lack of intention to become a party; or undue delay in effecting entry into force [13]. This tripartite framework provides the analytical scaffolding which is employed in Section 4 of the present article.

The concept of the 'object and purpose' of a treaty has provided a focus for much scholarly attention precisely because it serves as a jurisprudential touchstone not only in Article 18, but throughout the VCLT - for instance, in articles 19, 20, 31, and 41. Buffard and Zemanek [20] argued that 'object and purpose' represents an 'enigma' in treaty interpretation: while at first sight it seems to be a unitary concept, in practice courts and tribunals have used it inconsistently, at times treating 'object' and 'purpose' as synonyms, at other times distinguishing between them. Klabbers [21] developed this critique further, suggesting that the doctrine will be circular - interpreters try to define the purposes of the treaty, then test behavior against these purposes, but the use of those purposes is the construction of interpretive choices that are not necessarily neutral to values. In the CTBT's case, however, these ambiguities are to a large extent dissolved through the CTBT's unusually explicit preamble and operative provisions, which together define the prohibition of nuclear explosive testing as the cardinal object [2; 22].

The withdrawal or the de-ratification of treaties and their failure to sign can be regarded as a type of two-level withdrawal.

The general law of treaty withdrawal is contained in articles 54 to 64 of the VCLT, but these provisions are primarily concerned with the termination of obligations under treaties that have entered into force [23]. The VCLT is conspicuously silent as to the regulation of withdrawal from a treaty that has not entered into force-which the ILC recognised but left as an open issue on the basis that such situations were thought to be rare [17]. The 2023 de-ratification of Russia emphasizes the practical ineffectiveness of this does not exist.

The concept of 'unsigning' or the withdrawal of a signature to a treaty prior to ratification was systematically reviewed by [14] in a landmark contribution to the Stanford Law Review. Swaine analysed the United States' formal notification to the UN Secretary-General in May 2002 that it would not become a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which he says was a new and legally significant move which he calls 'unsigning.' Swaine contended that the VCLT, although not expressly considering such a step, the practical effect of such an unambiguous notification to the depositary that a state does not intend to ratify is to bring to an end the obligation under Article 18(a) and. Critically, Swaine noted that the legal force of the act is not about its formal quality as a 'withdrawal of signature' because signatures can hardly be 'withdrawn' once a treaty is closed for signature, but is instead the function of a clear expression of non-intent, which is precisely what Article 18(a) calls for to end the interim obligation [14].

The examination has expanded the analysis of treaty exit to include the full spectrum of ways in which states disengage from treaty regimes, such as withdrawal, denunciation, suspension, and de-ratification. Helfer suggested that such actions must be placed in a systemic context balancing the sovereign interest in exit and the collective interest in stability of treaties. His treatment draws attention to the fact that states can play their cards by strategically balancing between the amount of non-intent signaling they wish to employ, and do not going as far as to formally unsign, specifically because they desire optionality and do not wish to risk the legal costs of a more univocal departure. This insight is directly relevant to the conduct of Russia: the lack of non-intent unambiguous statement, coupled with ongoing participation in CTBTO activities, is suggestive of a deliberate strategy of legal ambiguity [24].

A study explores that the interaction of domestic politics and the ratification of treaties in the United States context and made the argument that how the executive handles unratified treaties, including its ability to unsign them by executive notification, represents a larger constitutional designation where the President determines treaty assent even without being subject to Senate preferences. While Bradley's analysis is focused mainly on US constitutional arrangements, its broader implication (that the act of unsigning has real legal consequences in terms of international law that will be reckoned with by rational executive actors) is instructive in assessing Russia's calculus in framing its de-ratification without a formal declaration of non-intent [25].

The subsequent practice by the United States in regards to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in April 2019 reinforced the pattern identified by Swaine. The US administration officially informed the depositary that it did not plan to seek ratification by the Senate and at the same time asked that the US be removed from the list of states that had expressed consent to be bound. The UN depositary received this notification and updated the list of status of this treaty accordingly [26]. Sadat [27] had earlier identified the systemic significance of these episodes in generating a body of state practice as to the legal effects of preentry-into-force disengagement from multilateral treaties. Cumulatively, the US practices form a paradigm against which a measure of Russia's conduct, which has no equivalent clarity of expression, may be compared.

2.2 Nuclear Testing Taboo and Compliance with CTBT.

The scholarly literature about the nuclear testing taboo sets the normative context within which Russia's de-ratification has to be measured. A study asserts that the progressive delegitimization of nuclear weapons use - and thus, nuclear testing - is the reflection of the operation of a deep normative taboo that restricts the behavior of states despite the lack of any formal legal obligation. Paul [12] also traces the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons as an emergent norm based on strategic restraint, concern about reputation and shared expectations, expanding framework to the much broader category of nuclear non-use. In this view, the CTBT's interim obligations under Article 18 are not only positive legal rules but are backed up by the general normative structure of the nuclear taboo.

Goldblat [11] is an invaluable historical and doctrinal account of arms control negotiations, which places the CTBT in the much longer arc from the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty through the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty to the ultimately unsuccessful operation to achieve a comprehensive ban during the Cold War. The analysis by Goldblat underlines the fact that the legally binding nature of the prohibition on nuclear explosive testing in the CTBT reflects a culmination of the norm building since the 1940s, and that any relapse to testing by a signatory would be seen not only as a violation of Article 18 but as an actual attack on that store of normative capital [11]. It would be subsumed by the effective collapse of the CTBT and identifies the monitoring and verification infrastructure of the treaty as a global public good whose compromising would bring about externalities well beyond the legal relationship between signatory and depositary diaspora.

The adoption of Resolution 2310 (2016) by the Security Council spawned its own interpretation in the form of scholarship. The resolution, which was one vote short of unanimity due to Egypt's abstention, was an authoritative statement of the proposition that the CTBT's object and purpose includes the total prohibition of nuclear explosive testing and that signatory states are bound not to undermine this norm [28]. The ensuing joint statement of the five NPT recognised nuclear weapon States - including Russia and the United States - further crystallised this interpretation as a matter of opinio juris. Roberts [29] has argued, in a broader context, that such joint statements by major powers, in the light of

constant conduct, has been a factor in the formation of customary international law; by implication, the 2016 statement reinforces the argument that Russia's Article 18 obligation is reinforced by a parallel customary norm [29].

2.3 Customary International Law Dimensions of Article 18 2.4

A good thread in the literature is concerned with the relationship between article 18 VCLT and customary international law. The question is important in that the VCLT itself is applicable only between its own parties; while for states not party to the Convention the interim obligation must flow from custom. A similar argument that some VCLT provisions, such as fundamental principles of the interpretation of treaties and of good faith, have reached the status of universal or near-universal customary international law by virtue of widespread acceptance by states and the lack of persistent objectors. International Law [30] affirm the methodological approach to evaluating such claims as developed by the ILC, which places emphasis on the two conditions of general practice and opinio juris [30]. Villiger [18] addresses the specific case of Article 18 in this regard, concluding that the provision reflects to a large extent pre-existing customary law and hence that its normative force in this regard extends beyond VCLT parties. Kirgis [31] has put forward a more subtle explanation, in that the opinio juris requirement may be fulfilled by a lower weight of practice where the normative pressure to a rule is marked--a sliding-scale test which would serve to strengthen the Article 18 obligation exactly in such a case as a weapon of mass destruction where the normative stakes are greatest.

Boyle and Chinkin [32] explored the general architecture of international law-making, which they characterize as a complex web of normative obligations that may overlap, reinforce, and sometimes conflict between different sources of international law: treaty law, customary law and soft-law instruments. In the CTBT context, such analysis means that Russia's interim obligation under Article 18 is not only a positive treaty rule but it is situated in the context of a web of reinforcing norms, including disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT, the customary prohibition on nuclear testing that some commentators point to as emerging and the associated reputational costs of violating the nuclear taboo [23; 32].

Pauwelyn [33] offers a much-needed methodological tool in navigating the interaction between VCLT regime and other sources of international obligation as treaty norms and customary norms should be viewed as working within a single normative structure rather than as two fully separate legal orders. This is a systemic view, which highlights how Russia's behaviour must be evaluated not by reference only to Article 18 in isolation but in consideration of its obligations under the NPT, its commitments under Resolution 2310 and its participation in the CTBTO's International Monitoring System - which all add weight to the conclusion that the interim obligation survives de-ratification [33; 34].

3. Methodology and Discussion

3.1 Methodology

This study applies a doctrinal method of legal research concerned with treaty interpretation and comparative state practice analysis. The main system of interpretation is the VCLT's own rules of treaty interpretation laid down in articles 31 to 33, according to which a treaty provision is to be construed in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in context and in view of the object and purpose of the treaty, with resort to the supplementary means of interpretation such as preparatory work and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty, if the first methods leave meaning ambiguous or manifestly absurd [9]. This methodology is used on the text of Article 18, with particular attention to the ILC's 1966 Commentary, which is the best available record of the intentions of the drafters [17; 22].

Comparative analysis has been used as a secondary methodological tool for placing Russia's behavior within the larger pattern of state practice relating to pre-entry into force treaty disengagement. The 2002 and 2019 notifications by the United States on the Rome Statute and the ATT respectively are analysed as paradigm cases that shed light on the legally operative concept of 'making intention clear' under article 18(a). This comparison is not based on some claims that the US and Russian legal situations are formally identical, rather, this comparison is employed for identifying the structural features of legally effective intent-clarification-against which Russia's less explicit conduct may be measured [14; 26; 27; 35].

The text and preamble of the CTBT, of the VCLT, ILC Draft Articles on the International Law [17], International Law [30], United Nations Security [10], CTBTO depository notifications and status lists, and the official Russian communications which are on the list of UN depositary notification CN.463.2023. Secondary sources include the academic literature reviewed in Section 2 and publicly available statements by Russian officials, the European Union, and CTBTO Executive Secretary.

3.2 Discussion: Russia's Position under Article 18 VCLT

The analytical question is whether the de-ratification process of November 2023 by Russia falls under either of the two conditions under which Article 18 interim obligations are exhausted. Under Article 18(a) the obligation of a signatory state is terminated when it 'has made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.' Under Article 18(b) - the provision applicable to states that have expressed consent to be bound pending entry into force, the obligation lasts 'provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.' Russia, who ratified the CTBT in 2000, fell under article 18(b) when it was still a ratifying state. By withdrawing its ratification, Russia reverted to signatory status, and so, arguably, moved into the ambit of Article 18(a). This is confirmed by the treatment of the depositary: the UN treaty collection currently contains Russia as signatory without a ratification date [7; 36].

The question then arises, whether Russia, as a de-ratified signatory, has 'made its intention clear not to become a party' within Article 18(a). The evidence really points to it having not. The official communications made by Russia on depositary did not include a declaration of non-intent to join the party. On the contrary, the Russian leaders clearly explained that Russia would still be a signatory and would still be involved in the activities of the CTBTO [6; 8]. This is the inverse of the US formula used in 2002 for the ICC ('the United States does not intend to become a party to the Rome Statute') and 2019 for the ATT, both of which are designed precisely to terminate obligations of Article 18 through the unambiguous expression of non-intent [14; 24]. It could not be more obvious: where the US was leaving in a clean way, Russia did so in a manner that would maintain optionality and simultaneously indicate dissatisfaction.

The 'undue delay' exception to Article 18(b) is equally inapplicable in the present circumstances. Russia did not cite this exception as a reason for their de-ratification; in fact, Russian officials made no reference to the CTBT's non-entry into force as the basis of their action. The ILC commentary notes that the 'unduly delayed' proviso was intended to prevent states being bound indefinitely where the treaty has failed to take sufficient hold in terms of ratifications - not to provide an exit route for states who have been frustrated by the failure of another state to ratify [15; 17; 18]. Russia's grievance was not directed at the systemic delay in the treaty's entry into force as such, but specifically at US non-ratification. In the absence of any authoritative threshold for what constitutes 'undue' delay - which is recognised by academics [13; 22]- and in light of the fact that the CTBT has been operational in its monitoring and verification functions for more than two decades, the more appropriate interpretation is that the 26 years since the opening of the treaty for signature are not tantamount to exceeding the threshold of 'undue' delay within the meaning of Article 18(b).

The reaction of the international community to Russia's de-ratification strengthens this legal analysis. The joint statement of the European Union explicitly called on all states - implicitly, Russia - 'to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty' [4]. The CTBTO Executive Secretary also highlighted the fact that Russia has to remain a signatory and a member of the verification regime [3]. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons requested CTBT states parties to oppose the de-ratification normalisation [37]. These reactions are a significant part of state and institutional practice that confirms the fact that the international community does not recognize that Russia has exited its interim obligations. Under the customary law framework for identifying opinio juris this convergent reaction has probative value [29; 30]. Kirgis's sliding scale approach to custom reinforces this conclusion: in the area of nuclear weapons, even a small amount of weight of opinio juris may be enough to produce the normative expectation [31].

4. Conclusion, Recommendations, and Implications

The recent November 2023 ratification withdrawal of the CTBT by Russia is a legally significant but ultimately inadequate measure to discontinue its interim duties under Article 18 of the VCLT. The evidence reviewed in this article points to three conclusions. First, Russia's de-ratification did not amount to a clear expression of intent not to become a party to the CTBT within the meaning of Article 18(a) which requires an unambiguous declaration to the depositary -- not merely a retraction of

ratification coupled with professions of continued signatory status. Second, Russia cannot avail itself of the Article 18(b) 'undue delay' exception, since it did not invoke the exception, since its grievance was directed at the conduct of a particular state, and not at the systemic delay in the entry into force of the treaty, since no authoritative threshold for 'undue' delay has been established that the non-entry into force period for the CTBT has plausibly crossed. Third, the state, the CTBTO and civil society responses internationally confirm that Russia is generally presumed to have stayed committed to the norm of nuclear explosive testing, which is in line with the Article 18 obligation that is amplified by a parallel customary norm and the political undertakings made under UNSC Resolution 2310 (2016).

This is followed by three recommendations. To begin with, states that signed the CTBT are asked to reaffirm by a decision of the CTBT Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force or a decision of the United Nations General Assembly that the non-intentional de-ratification does not extinguish the obligations of Article 18 to prevent imitation. Second, the International Law Commission should pick up the question of treaty disengagement before entry into force as a discrete topic of codification, with a view to elaborating draft conclusions to address the legal effects of de-ratification, unsigning and conditional signatory status with the precision that Article 18's current text does not provide. Third, Russia should be encouraged, via diplomatic channels and multilateral mechanisms, either to make a new instrument of ratification or, if it truly does not wish to be a CTBT party, to make an unequivocal declaration to that effect to the depositary - a step that would at least provide some legal clarity even as it undermined the treaty's universality.

The macro-issues of this analysis are not restricted to the CTBT. As multilateral treaty regimes come under growing stress from great power rivalry and strategic competition, the circumstances under which interim obligations survive or die will become more often in dispute. The conceptual framework created herein, the distinction between de-ratification and unsigning, the use of the Article 18(a) clear intention standard in a rigorous manner, and the use of the undue delay exception as something that must be positive invoked and meets an objective threshold, offers an analytical basis in the assessment of the analogous circumstances under other treaty regimes. The preservation of the clarity and predictability of the obligations including the interim obligations form the basis of the integrity of the international legal order and, in particular, arms-control architecture. The nuclear testing taboo - strengthened by both treaty law and emergent custom - is too important to be permitted to erode through strategic legal ambiguity.

References

[1] Simma B. From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law: Martinus Nijhoff; 1994. https://referenceworks.brill.com/display/entries/HACO/A9789041104199-02.xml

[2] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 1996 1996/09/24.Retrieved from: https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/2022_treaty_booklet_E.pdf

[3] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty O. Statement from Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO 2023 [Retrieved from: https://www.ctbto.org/resources/for-the-media/press-releases/statement-dr-robert-floyd-executive-secretary-comprehensive

[4] Council of the European U. Russia: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the revocation of the ratification to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 2023 [updated 2023/11/02. Retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/02/russia-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-revocation-of-the-ratification-to-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/

[5] State Duma of the Russian F. (2023). *Issue of De-ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*. Retrieved from http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/57993/

[6] Interfax. (2023, 2023/10/25). Federation Council approves CTBT de-ratification. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/95793/

[7] United Nations D. (2023). *Depositary Notification C.N.463.2023.TREATIES-XXVI.4 (CTBT): Withdrawal of the Instrument of Ratification by the Russian Federation*. Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

[8] President of R. (2023). *Law Revoking the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*. Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/72635

[9] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969). https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

[10] United Nations Security C. (2016). *Resolution 2310 (2016)*. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2310.pdf

[11] Goldblat J. Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements2002. https://www.torrossa.com/gs/resourceProxy?an=4913329&publisher=FZ7200

[12] Paul TV. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons: Stanford University Press; 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804771009

[13] Rydberg AV. Deciphering Interim Obligations Under Articles 18 and 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. International & Comparative Law Quarterly. 2024;73(4):1061-1082. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589324000289

[14] Swaine ET. Unsigning. Stanford Law Review. 2002;55:2061 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=383780

[15] Aust A. Modern treaty law and practice. 3rd ed: Cambridge University Press; 2013. https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/bi-c/2.%20Canada/4.%20Legal%20Authorities/RA-109.PDF

[16] McNair AD. Legal Character of Treaties. 1930. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004386242_017

[17] International Law C. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries. 1966.Retrieved from: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf

[18] Villiger ME. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Brill; 2008. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

[19] Sinclair I. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2nd ed: Manchester University Press; 1984. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1970304959910352058

[20] Buffard I, & Zemanek K. The 'object and purpose' of a treaty: An enigma? Austrian Review of International and European Law. 1998;3(1):311-343 https://brill.com/view/journals/ario/3/1/article-p311_.xml

[21] Klabbers J. Some problems regarding the object and purpose of treaties. The Finnish Yearbook of International Law: Brill Nijhoff; 1999. p. 138-160. https://brill.com/downloadpdf/edcollchap/book/9789004633742/B9789004633742_s004.pdf

[22] Dörr O, & Schmalenbach K. Vienna convention on the law of treaties: Springer; 2018. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8

[23] Hollis DB. The Oxford guide to treaties: Oxford University Press; 2020. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-guide-to-treaties-9780198848349?cc=ae&lang=en&

[24] Helfer LR. Exiting treaties. Virginia Law Review. 2005;91:1579 https://www.jstor.org/stable/3649442

[25] Bradley CA. Unratified treaties, domestic politics, and the US Constitution. Harvard International Law Journal. 2007;48:307 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=943001

[26] United Nations D. (2019). *Depositary Notification C.N.314.2019.TREATIES-XXVI.8 (Arms Trade Treaty): United States—Communication*. Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2019/CN.314.2019-Eng.pdf

[27] Sadat L. The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium: Brill; 2021. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0731126500010398

[28] Alvarez JE. International organizations as law-makers: Oxford University Press; 2006. https://academic.oup.com/book/3580

[29] Roberts A. Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation. American Journal of International Law. 2001;95(4):757-791. Doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2674625

[30] International Law C. Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries. 2018.Retrieved from: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_13_2018.pdf

[31] Kirgis FL. Custom on a sliding scale. American Journal of International Law. 1987;81(1):146-151. Doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2202144

[32] Boyle A, & Chinkin C. The making of international law: Oxford University Press; 2007. https://academic.oup.com/oxford-law-pro/book/57213

[33] Pauwelyn J. Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law: Cambridge University Press; 2003.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Petros-Mavroidis/publication/4857630

[34] Cassese A. International law: Oxford University Press; 2005. https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/casseses-international-law-9780199231287?cc=ae&lang=en&

[35] United Nations D. (2002). *Depositary Notification C.N.434.2002.TREATIES-5 (Rome Statute): United States—Communication*. Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2002/CN.434.2002-Eng.pdf

[36] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty O. Status of signatures and ratifications 2023 [Retrieved from: https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/states-signatories

[37] International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear W. Civil society calls for renewed push for all states to join Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 2023 [updated 2023/10/24. Retrieved from: https://www.icanw.org/civil_society_calls_for_renewed_push_for_all_states_to_join_nuclear_test_ban_treaty