

The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability

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Abstract: It should come as no surprise that prisons can become breeding grounds for radicalisation and terrorism [1]. In many cases, extremist ideologies can flourish in prisons through recruiting vulnerable inmates to follow their path. Despite being a popular topic among researchers and policymakers, there still remain significant gaps in our understanding and many unanswered questions. This paper provides an overview on prisoner radicalisation, specifically exploring the role religion plays in prison and its link to radicalisation, prisoner vulnerability to radicalisation and the radicalisation process. The paper also outlines the current debate regarding where is the best place to house terrorist prisoners (isolation vs. separation). The paper concludes by identifying the major gaps in the literature and offers concluding remarks.

Keywords: radicalisation; terrorism; prisons

1. Introduction

Prisoner radicalisation is not a recent phenomenon and yet it is an area that is misunderstood and theoretically underdeveloped. Throughout history prisons have served as recruitment centres and headquarters for ideological extremists (such as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler), where they used their time behind bars to develop extremist philosophies and recruit others into their mode of thinking [2]. Some of the most powerful criminal groups, such as

the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in São Paulo, Brazil, and the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, originated in prisons [3]. Even so, since 11 September 2001 (9/11) several individuals have been radicalised while being incarcerated [4]. For example, prisoner Richard Reid converted to Islam while incarcerated and when released attempted to smuggle explosives on an American airline flight in December 2001 [5]. Research suggests that many prisoners enter prison with little or no religious calling, but over the duration

of their incarceration some adopt a faith (e.g. Islam) [6]. However, of those who convert to Islam only a very small percentage will turn into radical extremists and an even smaller percentage will go on to join a terrorist organisation [7]. An interesting study conducted by the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, claim that roughly 80% percent of prisoners within America turn to Islam when seeking for faith behind bars [6]. This percentage translates into a prisoner conversion rate of approximately 30,000 yearly [7].

Prisons by their very nature are hostile environments (e.g. their isolation, cultural dissatisfaction, and predisposition for violent tendencies) and as such are susceptible to radicalisation extremists [8]. The 2009 World Prison Population List estimates that more than 9.8 million people are held in penal institutions around the world and almost a third of these are in the United States (USA, 2.29 million [9]). Even more interesting, is that around 300 federal prisoners in the US are serving sentences on terrorism-related charges [8]. Terrorists jailed for criminal activities can thrive in prison. Recruiters are able to spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to follow their path, drawing from a constantly regenerating pool of candidates [10,11]. Terrorist recruitment therefore "operates in the deep underground of inmate subculture, between the seams of prison gangs and extremist religions that inspire ideologies of intolerance, hatred, and violence" ([7], p. 111). This type of environment allows terrorist recruitment to flourish and can remain virtually undetected. However, with the many advances in technology, education and increased prison personnel, these advances are making it extremely hard for terrorist recruitment to remain undetected.

Prisoner radicalisation is a popular topic of discussion; however, despite this recognition it has not been fully explored and is a phenomenon that is not well understood [1,12]. Furthermore, the process of radicalisation in prisons in particular is poorly understood because of the very limited information researchers can obtain and this consequently obstructs the development or improvement of effective intervention methods [4]. Radicalisation, by most accounts, can create the motivational or cognitive preconditions for terrorism and therefore it is important that we understand the prerequisite for effectively combating terrorism [13].

An even more interesting and well-rehearsed argument among researchers and practitioners is that there has been an inadequate effort to define radicalisation [14]. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) to radicalise is to: 1) cause (someone) to become an advocate of radical political or social reforms and 2) introduce fundamental or far-reaching change [15]. Only recently has the OED defined radicalisation. Radicalisation according to the OED means: "The action or process of making or becoming radical, esp. in political outlook" [15]. This

definition however, is extremely vague. Currently, many organisations and scholars have come up with their own definition; however, despite having some similarities among these definitions there still lacks a generic definition that can be used across all disciplines and organisations. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark defines radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism" ([16], p. 8). This definition is very subjective in that the radicalisation label applied to an individual requires making an assessment about the possible harm that an individual poses to another party [13]. This definition is also very general, stating that embracing any views/opinions can ultimately lead to acts of terrorism.

In contrast, the Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Justice [17] claims radicalisation is "the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes" (p. 6). Similarly, a review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers by the Department of Justice [17] states that radicalisation "refers to the process by which inmates ...adopt extreme views including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes" (p. 6). This places more emphasis on the cognitive (that views and beliefs justify violence) and behavioural aspects (invitation to join a group) [13]. These definitions acknowledge that radicalisation is a process and, unlike the definition by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, they state that radicalisation is when an individual adopts 'extremist' views, rather than simply adopting any opinions or views. More recently, Fraihi [18] provides a succinct definition which brings us closer to defining radicalisation. In a recent essay Fraihi [18] states:

Radicalization is a process in which an individual's convictions and willingness to seek for deep and serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism and radicalization are not necessarily negative. Moreover, different forms of radicalization exist. This concentration on the individual is indicative of the focus of expert and government concern (p. 135).

An important distinction from the previous definitions is that Fraihi [18] acknowledges that not all radicalisation is negative and that radicalisation is not always a precursor to terrorism. It also suggests that radicalisation is an individual experience, whereby the individual has to be 'willing' to undergo some deep or serious change. Moreover, it is a psychological process where individuals move towards more extremist views [19].

As with radicalisation, terrorism also seems to be a hard concept to define. Bilgi [20] outlines that this stems from two main reasons: first, the term

terrorism is often interpreted as a pejorative concept, meaning that those who are defined as terrorists are said to 'deserve the blame', and secondly, terrorism is used in highly emotive settings, meaning that terrorism is often associated with violence, death, and war. Although these reasons make it seem impossible to define, it is not an impossible task to do so. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objection" ([20], p. 12). While the European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism defines it as:

An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person's life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives (cited in the European Report [21], p. 6).

This is a legal definition of terrorism and, as such, only partially overlaps with those used by academics. There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, often emphasising a variety or feature of terrorism such as:

...its often symbolic in nature, its often indiscriminate nature, its typical focus on civilian and non-combatant targets its sometimes provocative and retributive aims, the disruption of public order and endangering of public security, the creation of a climate of fear to influence an audience wider than the direct victims as well as its disregard of the rules of war and the rules of punishment ([22], p. 6).

Many scholars have also come up with their own definition of terrorism. For example, Jenkins [23] defines terrorism as "the use or threatened use of force to bring about change" (p. 3). Similarly, Sederberg defines terrorism as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate victim" (cited in [24], p. 4). What is common among these definitions is that terrorism includes the unlawful use of violence with the aim of pursuing political or social objectives that target enemies [20]. Also, many scholars agree that the root cause or procurer of terrorism is not radicalisation—simply because not all radicals become terrorists [25].

Today, many governments, especially Western

governments (after the 9/11 attack) are concerned about the threat of terrorism and are primarily focused on what is called 'Radical Islam', a term defined as "the politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible" ([26], p. 3). However, it is important to note that 'Radical Islam' does not always mean violence and cannot be a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals are not terrorists [13,25].

Overall, it is a well known argument among scholars that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' definition of radicalisation or terrorism that will satisfy all disciplines and practitioners. The terms radicalisation and terrorism are not precise concepts but rather pejorative labels, and therefore it is not surprising that there has been an inadequate effort to define them.

This paper begins by outlining the penal system and the role of religion. Next, it outlines the different types of recruitment methods employed by Islamic extremist groups and discusses the process of radicalisation. Finally, it concludes by examining an ongoing debate as to whether terrorists should be isolated, concentrated, or separated from ordinary criminals.

2. Prison and Religion

Some prisons are notorious for being harsh environments and for many inmates religion is one of the methods used to cope with the prison environment [27]. There is a belief, especially in prisons in the US, that religion plays a profound and necessary role in the creation and maintenance of a moral and law abiding community [28]. For example, religion is widely practised among the two million prisoners in the US [28]. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Muslim population has risen from 4,298 in 2000 to 10,672 in 2011 [29]. In the US approximately 350,000 inmates are Muslim (2003) and 80% of prisoners who convert while in prison convert to Islam [8]. Islam conversion in prisons is not a new phenomenon and has been present in American prisons since their inception in the early nineteenth century ([30], p. 90). As Lofland and Stark [31] state:

The intellectual mode of conversion commences with an individual, private investigation of possible new grounds of being, alternate theodicies, personal fulfilment, etc., by reading books, watching television, attending lectures, and other impersonal or disembodied ways in which it is increasingly possible sans social involvement to become acquainted with alternate ideologies and ways of life. In the course of such reconnaissance, some individuals convert themselves in isolation from any interaction with devotees of the respective religion (p. 376).

The literature on Islam in prisons is divided into two schools of thought. One side indicates that Muslim groups in prison are breeding grounds for terrorists and the other side indicates that there is no relationship between prisoner conversion to Islam and terrorism [7]. Nevertheless, research shows that religion plays an important role in prison security and rehabilitation [7]. Clear and Sumter [27] administered self-report questionnaires to 769 prisoners from 12 state prisons and found that increasing levels of religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison adjustment and are also significantly related to a smaller number of times inmates are placed in disciplinary confinement for violating prison rules. O'Connor and Perreyclear [28] also found that as religion intensified prison disciplinary infractions declined.

Similarly, Roy [32] argues that it makes more sense to separate theology from violence:

'The process of violent radicalisation has little to do with religious practice, while radical theology, as salafisme, does not necessarily lead to violence'. The 'leap into terrorism' is not religiously inspired, but better seen as sharing 'many factors with other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination for sudden suicidal violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools (the "Columbine syndrome")' (Roy, cited in [19], p. 21).

However, there are also cases where religion has been used to breed terrorists. For example, Kevin Lamar James recruited more than a dozen fellow prisoners into a terrorist group called Jam'iyyat U-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) [7]. According to Ian Cuthbertson, James convinced these men that his interpretation of the Koran (called the JIS Protocol) was the true version [10]. Members of JIS were also recruited outside prison walls. Prospective JIS members outside prison were instructed to blend into society by marrying, getting a job, dressing casually and needed to acquire two pistols with silencers and learn how to make bombs [33]. These men were later instructed to attack government agencies and military stations throughout the US [10,33].

Another case is Jamal 'el Chino' Ahmidan who embraced jihadist principles while serving time and is the mastermind behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Richard Reid, known as the 'shoe bomber', who attempted to blow up an American Airline flight between Paris and Miami in 2001, also converted to Islam while serving time for a string of muggings [7,34].

3. Vulnerability

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to

recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment recruiters can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group [35]. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt) and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear, sadness) [35]. This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the impressionable.

There are also instances where an incarcerated individual can lose their grip on their individual identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are incarcerated in another country and do not speak the language [35]. For instance, in the UK, the proportion of foreign national prisoners has increased steadily over the past decade. In the 1990s the foreign population accounted for around 8% of the total population and this increased to 13% by 2012 [29]. Many of these foreign prisoners have little knowledge of the country, let alone the culture of the country, and to top it off many do not speak the language (having lived, worked and/or socialised in their immigrant communities) [10], thus making the individual more susceptible and vulnerable to extremist groups.

One theory that can help us understand prisoner vulnerability is the Transformative Learning Theory (TLT) developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow. This is a framework for understanding how change (learning) occurs in individuals—more specifically, how adults learn and adapt to new environments [36,37]. In this instance we are using it to understand the behavioural changes prisoners undergo while in prison and how this learning transformation makes them more vulnerable to radical extremists.

When an individual goes through some sort of crisis (known as the transformative trigger), the individual uses pre-existing habits to make sense of the event [36]. However, when the individual cannot make sense of the situation and resorting back to their habitual ways fails to help them manage the event this becomes known as a 'distortion'. As a result, the individual reacts to the meaning distortion by exploring new experiences and undergoing critical reflection (e.g. turning to religion for guidance) [36]. These new perspectives help the individual cope with the new environment by helping create new behaviours, roles, and relationships [36,38]. Overall, this transformation allows individuals to manage their new environment, adapt to a new daily routine and ultimately help an individual learn how to get past a crisis [36]. However, going through a crisis can make the individual easier to persuade and even more open

to manipulation and brainwashing [35], thus making them very susceptible to extremist recruitment.

TLT can help shed light on the process and precursors of prison radicalisation. Individual radicalisation is not only associated with particular socio-political contexts (e.g. prison) and personal characteristics, but is also a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition and identity reassessment [37,39]. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or experience confusion over identity or intense personal debate, eventually a point is reached whereby the individual comes to the realisation that their old identity no longer exists and a new one must be established [37]. Therefore, when radicalised individuals socialise and are validated by other 'like-minded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced and the new identity is strengthened [37]. Ultimately, those individuals who become violent, radicalised inmates not only justify their actions but such actions are also expected among the greater group of radicals.

Hamm [7] interviewed intelligence officials in Florida and California in December 2007 and found that Florida prisoners were vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. One official stated: "radicalized prisoners are very aware that people (authorities) are interested in radicalized prisoners. They are very careful who they talk to in prison." The official also noted that most inmates are radicalised by other radical inmates and not by outside influence [7].

Overall, the majority of studies have focused on demographic variables to look at the vulnerability of individuals, mainly because they are much easier to access than other variables [40]. However, many empirical studies show that psychographic variables, such as attitudes, emotions, preconceptions, and motivations, seem to matter most regarding the success rate [41].

4. Models of Recruitment

Recruitment plays a significant role in any terrorist organisation. Individuals can use their expertise to spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to follow the same path [11]. There are four different models of recruitment: *the net*, *the funnel*, *the infection* and *the seed crystal* [40].

The net pattern occurs when the target population is equally engaged; for example, all members are given the same book to read or are invited to a meeting (see Figure 1a). In this instance, the target audience is viewed as homogeneous and the group can be approached with a single undifferentiated pitch [40]. *The funnel* pattern occurs when a recruiter takes an incremental approach (characterised by milestones) when he or she believes the target or focal segment population is a prime target (see Figure 1b). This process requires an individual to have the

right motivation and undergo a significant transformation in identity. Therefore an individual starts at one end of the process and is transformed into a dedicated group member at the other end [40]. *The infection* pattern occurs when a trusted agent is inserted into the target population to rally potential recruits through direct personal appeals (see Figure 1c). Infection is likely to be successful where most members are not extremists; this allows the infiltrator to be able to convert selected members who are dissatisfied [40]. Finally, *the seed crystal* pattern occurs when the target is very difficult to access and is very remote:

This may be compared to lowering the temperature of a glass until the water inside it cools and then ice crystals form as the seeds of a complete freeze ([40], p. 79; see Figure 1d).

In terms of al-Qaida, this approach may be the most successful in populations where open recruitment is difficult, such as prisons.

The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley, 2006 ([40], pp. 73–89) are shown in Figure 1.

5. Social Movement Theory and Recruitment

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks applied to understanding radicalisation is Social Movement Theory (SMT). Although SMT has been used in social science for the past few decades, its application to understanding radicalisation is in its infancy. Della Porta [42] was one of the first terrorism researchers to use the SMT concepts in her study of violent and extremist Italian and German militants. Della Porta [42] found that militant radicals were bound together by personal ties and by their shared activist experiences and participating radicals acted as a self-reinforcing mechanism to drive radical activists to become increasingly more radical.

Zald and McCarthy [43] define social movement as: "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (p. 2). The idea behind this theory is that "movements arose from irrational processes of collective behaviour occurring under strained environmental conditions (what sociologists would call Strain Theory), producing a mass sentiment of discontent. Individuals would 'join' a movement because they passively succumbed to these overwhelming social forces" ([44], p. 17). According to SMT, members recruit others on a rational basis in order to be effective and efficient. These recruiters seek to identify individuals who are likely to agree to participate and who are seen to be potential individuals who can further their cause [44,45].




Figure 1. The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley ([40], pp. 73–89): a) The Net; b) The Funnel; c) The Infection; d) The Seed Crystal.

Brady et al. [45] explain the process of recruitment as one of 'rational prospecting', meaning that recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual prospects that demonstrate the greatest 'participation potential', and have conceptualised the process as having two stages: 1) using information to find prospects; and 2) getting to 'yes' which is outlined in Figure 2.

In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information regarding the target individual (such as past activities the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter assesses whether or not the individual has characteristics (such as political interests or concerns about political politics) that might predispose them to take part in their extremist activities [45-47]. Overall, a recruiter wants as much information as possible regarding the potential recruit, especially involving the individual's political engagement [45]. However, this information is not easily accessible; the amount of information obtained will depend on the relationship developed between the recruiter and the recruit.




Figure 2. Process of recruitment.

In the second stage the recruiter needs to get a positive result (i.e. the individual recruit accepts and becomes an active member). In order to successfully achieve this, the recruiter may entice the recruit with various gratifications or incentives [45]. This is particularly true when the recruiter has control over punishments and rewards because the more power the recruiter appears to have the more likely it is that the recruit will join the cause [45]. In addition, having a relationship (preferably a close relationship) will help leverage the cause, unlike approaching a complete stranger. Prisoner radicalisation often operates like street gangs where prison gangs are generally drawn along racial and ethnic lines. Prisoners prior to incarceration who are affiliated with a certain gang may therefore naturally gravitate towards similar gang organisations in prison where members have each others' backs [2,48]. Prison gangs know that prisons have limited resources and as a result they flourish within prisons despite the best efforts of corrections officials—and extremist gangs are no exception [49].

Hamm [7] worked with the US Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII), a program to prevent potential acts of terrorism by inmates in the US. The CII accessed 2,088 state and local correctional facilities in the US and Hamm [7] found that radicalisation is developed on the prison gang model and prisoner radicalisation cannot be separated from the prison gang problem. Gang members were seen to be crossing racial lines, joining forces to create larger groups and some crossovers involved supremacists joining militant Islamic groups [7].

"Broadly defined, prison gangs are an 'organization' which operates within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a select group of inmates who have established an organized chain of command and are governed by an established code of conduct" ([50], p. 371). Many prison gangs use intimidation and violence which is usually directed at outsiders to control their prison environment [51].

Another study by Ungerer [48] interviewed 33 men convicted on charges of terrorism by the Indonesian courts in 2010. One man interviewed (Sonhadi) explained that terrorist convicts would band together and form something akin to a 'shadow government' in prison: "They often pool their available resources to ask for better cells, better food and other small luxuries. They'd also run small businesses in prison, from selling top-up cards for mobile phones to setting up food stalls selling rice, cooking oil and sugar" ([48], p. 12). There is also prestige associated with terrorist convicts and many convicts regard them with respect because of their willingness to lay down their lives for religion [48]. A number of men interviewed also stated that they have elevated status in society after serving time [48]. It is not known if this is a broadly accepted practice across all non-western prisons, but it was evident in Ungerer's 2011 research on the radicalisation of inmates within the Indonesian prison system.

6. Process of Radicalisation

Some researchers reject the notion that radicalisation can be understood by a sequence of fixed stages (e.g. Sageman [52]) while others view radicalisation as an orderly series of stages with terrorism being the final destination [29]. In 2007, the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD) published a study, *Radicalization in the West: The home-grown threat*, which outlines a simplified radicalisation model. In this report it identifies that 'jihadist' ideology is the key driver of radicalisation and suggests four stages to explain the process of radicalisation: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation stages [19,29]. These four stages are described as a 'funnel' through which ordinary individuals' religious beliefs become progressively more radical and this once ordinary individual becomes a terrorist [29].

The first stage, pre-radicalisation, occurs when individuals are placed in environments that allow them to be receptive to extremism [2]. This can be driven by either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation could be the result of a personal crisis/trauma, experiences of discrimination and/or alienation [2,53], or individuals may feel frustration and dissatisfaction with their current religious faith leading them to change their belief system [11]. On the other hand, extrinsic motivations could be any

external factor (e.g. economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, or social deprivation) that may negatively affect an individual's attitude and belief towards those implicated; leading to a change of faith as the answer to the perception of deprivation they are experiencing [11].

The second stage, self-identification, occurs when the individual identifies him/herself with a particular extremist cause and essentially changes his/her religious beliefs or behaviours. These individuals begin to construct a new character based on religion and support for radicalised ideologies [11]. Also, certain types of experiences, including the amount of exposure to Islamic radicalism (e.g. jihadist videos), are more likely to drive the convert from a conversion to jihad. Guidance from supervisors and encouragement to socialise with other 'like-minded' individuals reinforces their new sense of identity and commitment [14]. Therefore, overseas travel can have a significant impact on the acceleration of the radicalisation process [11]. Overall, the individual's needs and wants are increasingly removed and replaced by those of the collective [14].

The third stage, indoctrination, furthers this mindset and readiness for action [14]. It occurs once a convert has accepted the radical ideology but may be unsure or unfamiliar with how to participate. Part of this stage is becoming an active participant. This involves small-group and individual participation that allows the recruit to know and recognise his/her potential as a jihadist. What is critical in this stage is the knowledge, skills, and leadership of senior figures. This is a highly volatile and emotional stage for recruits [14]. Confidence increases over time and the individual's mind becomes saturated with radical ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to stand up for what they believe in through violent action [11].

The final stage, *jihadisation*, is engaging directly in terrorist activities (which can be violent or non-violent) and is always done with the intention of inflicting damage to the enemy: "During this stage, role identification can be so strong as to completely erase a sense of individualisation, thereby preventing the possibility of the individual acting in their own self interests by leaving the group" ([14]. p. 40). It is important to note that these stages are not chronological and individuals can skip stages, reaching more violent actions quicker [53]. It also means that individuals may stop the process and may not be fully radicalised; conversely, even if they are fully radicalised they will not necessarily carry out a terrorist attack [29]: "Commitment is constantly calibrated and re-calibrated. Some drop out along the way. A component of our counter-recruiting strategy must be to always offer a safe way back from the edge" ([23], p. 4).

Silber and Bhatt's [29] model represents radicalisation as key transition points along a time

course beginning with ordinary-life individuals and moving down a path where these individuals have direct involvement in terrorist activities [13]. However, this model lacks a full understanding of psychological, organisational, and social processes that lead people into radicalisation and their continuation towards committing acts of terrorism [13].

7. Concluding Remarks

Radicalisation is a modern social phenomenon and has displayed a substantial presence and complexity as an emergent concept among disciplines [14]. Yet there are still major problems surrounding the concept of radicalisation, for instance defining the concept of radicalisation and terrorism, collecting empirical data, and building integrative theory [54].

There are many conclusions to be drawn from this literature review. First, in order for experts and scholars to gain a better understanding of the concept of radicalisation a generic definition needs to be established. From the literature provided above, it seems that within the definition of radicalisation there needs to be some reference to 'extreme movement activity', that radicalisation is a 'process' over time, and that 'not all radicals' or radical thoughts lead to terrorist actions. Achieving clarity in defining the concept of radicalisation and using appropriate guidance from existing theories (such as SMT) will help provide a platform for moving forward.

Second, it is important to acknowledge that each one of us can potentially have opinions that others would consider radical. This does not mean that individuals, with criminals being no exception, with radical thoughts are setting themselves up for committing acts of terrorism. In reality, radicals and radical ideas can play a positive role in communities. For example many historical figures were considered radical, such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Gandhi. Even some violent radicals have been seen to be acting in the name of the cause and that their actions were just, such as the nineteenth century American abolitionist, John Brown, who used violent acts to fight slavery [55,56].

Third, radicals and individuals who undergo the radicalisation process are different from ordinary criminals. Hoffman [57] points out that both terrorists and criminals employ violence to attain specific goals; however, terrorists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, whereas criminals are largely driven by material gain. Hoffman [57] also suggests that terrorists believe they are fighting for a cause. Finally, terrorists seek to impact and influence a wider audience, while criminals do not generally seek to disseminate terror to the general public [58]. Individuals who contemplate committing terrorist acts (such as killing citizens) do so because they believe that these actions are feasible and just [37]. However, not all radicalisation is negative nor does it lead to

violence. For example, radical Islamic Puritanism involves seeking greater religious purity (e.g. the individual returns to a 'pure Islam') and separating themselves from the influences of Western society [18]. However, when making a distinctive difference between individuals who accept radical ideas and individuals who actively participate in violent behaviour, there can be some blurring between individuals since not all individuals who radicalise end up participating in violent behaviour [37].

Fourth, a prisoner's vulnerability to radicalisation does not end after release from prison. Many individuals who leave prison lack basic support (e.g. financial, emotional, or familial support) and where support does exist, it is often provided by community and religious groups. This gives extremist groups the opportunity to disguise the organisation as a legitimate support group where ties with former prisoners can be maintained. One extremist group, al-Haramain, maintained a database containing information (including names, release dates and the addresses to which the individuals would be released) on over 15,000 prisoners who were classified as vulnerable to the group's message [58,59].

Fifth, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing debate that surrounds two questions: 1) Where is the most appropriate place to contain terrorists? and 2) What is the most effective way of doing so? [12]. Researchers have suggested two possible strategies for incarcerating prisoners: isolation or concentration. The isolation method separates terrorists from each other [5]. Neumann [5] indicated that this is the most effective way to deter terrorists from ideologies because their communication is hindered and interaction with other terrorists has stopped. It also makes it very difficult for terrorists to organise future attacks because of the high level of security. The second method is concentration, where all terrorists are imprisoned in the one facility and specialised resources (e.g. staff in the field of linguistics or de-radicalisation training teams) are employed [12]. From a resource perspective concentration is beneficial as high security resources are only needed in a few locations [12]. However, it can have problematic consequences. For example, many jihad extremist groups are made up of small, loosely affiliated cells and teams. It is therefore possible that if such individuals are concentrated their loose networks could consolidate into a more cohesive and organised form [12]. Overall, academics in the field of terrorism (see [2,5,7,10]) agree that we may be facilitating radicalism by integrating converted Islamic extremists with criminals.

Finally, even though radicalisation does not always result in violence, it is important to establish effective methods to minimise 'the minority' of radicals who have the potential to become violence. Some may argue that only a small percentage of radicals actually partake in extreme violence. However, it is important

to remember that the goal is to minimise violence, regardless of how big or small the potential threat may appear to be.

Scholars have suggested that the root cause of prison radicalisation is related to overcrowding of maximum security prisons, with few rehabilitative programmes, and a shortage of chaplains to provide religious guidance [7]. These root causes should be explored in conjunction with topics such as inmate subculture, extremist interpretations of religious doctrines and how they lead to hatred and violence,

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and the vulnerability of inmates to radicalism. Future studies should also recognise and take into consideration that radicalisation is a process that occurs over time and that these stages are not sequential and the speed in which an individual goes through these stages can vary significantly depending on individual circumstances. Ultimately, this phenomenon needs to be explored more fully so we can enhance our understanding and provide effective solutions to minimise radicalisation in prisons [1,12].

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